Martin Hackmann is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of California Los Angeles, a faculty research fellow at the National Bureau of Economic Research, and a CESifo research network member. Professor Hackmann’s research specializes in topics in industrial organization and health economics.
Professor Hackmann holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Yale University and a Diplom (Master equivalent) in Economics from the University of Mannheim.
Publications and Forthcoming Papers
“Adverse Selection and an Individual Mandate: When Theory Meets Practice” (with Amanda E. Kowalski and Jonathan T. Kolstad). American Economic Review, March 2015. Vol. 105, No.3: 1030-66 (NBER Working Paper 19149). [Latest pre-publication version [PDF]]
We develop a model of selection that incorporates a key element of recent health reforms: an individual mandate. Using data from Massachusetts, we estimate the parameters of the model. In the individual market for health insurance, we find that premiums and average costs decreased significantly in response to the individual mandate. We find an annual welfare gain of 4.1% per person or $51.1 million annually in Massachusetts as a result of the reduction in adverse selection. We also find smaller post-reform markups.
“Health Reform, Health Insurance, and Selection: Estimating Selection into Health Insurance Using the Massachusetts Health Reform” (with Amanda E. Kowalski and Jonathan T. Kolstad). American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, May 2012, Vol. 102, No.3: 498-501. [PDF]
We implement an empirical test for selection into health insurance using changes in coverage induced by the introduction of mandated health insurance in Massachusetts. Our test examines changes in the cost of the newly insured relative to those who were insured prior to the reform. We find that counties with larger increases in insurance coverage over the reform period face the smallest increase in average hospital costs for the insured population, consistent with adverse selection into insurance before the reform. Additional results, incorporating cross-state variation and data on health measures, provide further evidence for adverse selection.
“Incentivizing Better Quality of Care: The Role of Medicaid and Competition in The Nursing Home Industry” (Latest Version: August 2015) [PDF] Revise & Resubmit, American Economic Review
This paper develops a model of the nursing home industry to investigate the quality effects of policies that either raise regulated reimbursement rates or increase local competition. Using data from Pennsylvania, I estimate the parameters of the model. The findings indicate that nursing homes increase the quality of care, measured by the number of skilled nurses, by 8.2% following a universal 10% increase in Medicaid reimbursement rates. I find an annual welfare gain of $68 million, 30% of additional Medicaid spending. In contrast, I find that pro-competitive policies lead to only small increases in staffing ratios.
“Parental Leave Programs, Nurse Shortages, and Patient Health”, joint with Benjamin Friedrich (Latest Version: July 2016) [PDF]
Nurses define the largest health profession in most OECD countries and play a critical role in the delivery of health care services. At the same time, there is a growing concern about potential nurse shortages in several high-income countries as the population and the nursing work force ages. We investigate the effects of a nurse shortage induced by a child care leave program on patient health in Denmark. We find that the program reduced the number of employed nurses in hospitals and nursing homes by 12% and 11% respectively and led to an average increase in mortality in nursing homes by 12.5% for the population aged 65 and older. This suggests that nurse staffing needs in nursing homes are a concern of growing importance as the population ages and the demand for long term care services increases.
Work in Progress
“Evaluating the Allocative Efficiency in Long Term Care Using Variation in Occupancies”, joint with Vincent Pohl